Dilma Rousseff might be gone, but Brazil’s political crisis certainly isn’t

The vote that sealed Michel Temer’s installation into power in Brazil took place precisely one week after the end of the Rio Olympic Games and just days before the G20 summit. Major disturbances were avoided during the Games and the new president was confirmed in his post just in time to take his flight and enjoy a convenient round of handshakes and photos with world leaders in China. Everything was carefully planned to make the arbitrary removal of a democratically elected president look like business as usual.

That’s not to say the new leadership in Brazil isn’t worried about whether it appears legitimate. Over the past few months, the alliance forged to oust Dilma Rousseff rejected calling the impeachment process that it was sponsoring a coup d’état. Some even threatened to take legal action against those making this claim in official debates. Their narrative insisted that constitutional procedures were observed.

It is true that, unlike the sudden impeachment carried out after just a couple of days in Paraguay in 2012, or the clear use of force in Honduras in 2009, formalities were observed in the surreal trial of Rousseff. For over five months alleged government accounting irregularities were treated as one of the most serious crimes in Brazilian political history and were carefully analysed by zealous legislators, including some accused of many crimes themselves, ranging from corruption to money laundering. Suddenly the same country that was capable of silently coping with a routine of impunity in notorious cases of state violence, such as the mass murder of street children or landless workers, became fixated on the legality of administrative budgeting orders.

Rousseff’s fate was decided long before the last vote in the senate

Irrespective of such bizarre and creative legal analysis, Rousseff’s fate was decided long before the last vote in the senate, by the collapse of the heterogeneous coalition that sustained her government and that made her the easy prey of an ultra-conservative legislature rattled by uncontrolled corruption investigations.

This transition sheds light on the structural weaknesses of Brazil’s democracy. The conservative congressmen who led the process of impeachment had been, in fact, key supporters of Rousseff, and of all other presidents of Brazil since the end of the dictatorship in 1985. Without their support, government majority in parliament would be impossible. With the arrival of Temer to the top post, this collection of ultra-conservative and corrupt forces has finally achieved hegemonic control over the executive and legislative branches.

Even with the careful re-arrangement of forces in the parliament and the enthusiastic support of the Brazilian mainstream media (often controlled by politicians), it is hard to believe that Temer will enjoy the same calm mood he should now meet in China. Judicial investigations of corruption are still ongoing and threaten Temer personally and his most direct allies, and political polarisation remains at an all-time high in Brazil.

The impeachment of Rousseff will leave deep scars in political and institutional life. Not only will the country be headed by an artificial leadership arrangement; the new coalition comes to power imposing a radical turn to the right which was defeated in four previous elections. Law reforms are to be pushed through by the new leadership to undermine laws protecting workers and severely restricting mandatory expenditure in health and education over the next decades as the magical solution to restore global trust in the country’s economy. Parliament is also on the verge of concluding a stream of measures undermining rights in critical areas such as the defence of indigenous lands and the environment, as well as threatening sexual and reproductive rights.

The Brazilian crisis is not unique. Perhaps as a late consequence of the global economic debacle of 2008, mainstream political forces in all regions are now dealing with very high levels of dissatisfaction and battling strident voices and movements. In some places, this new wave is resulting in violence and serious damage to the rule of law and democracy.

In Brazil it is clear that the combined economic and political crisis is offering a golden opportunity for an ultra-conservative alliance to regain control of power and demolish part of the legacy of the brief democratic experience. Such a dramatic ending of what was once believed to be one of the very few positive experiences of pragmatic left leadership in the global south will certainly resonate beyond its borders, particularly in Latin America. The tasks of promoting democracy and human rights in an extremely unequal society are far more complex than Brazil once made the world believe.